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Oregon v. Ashcroft: The Attorney

General's Attempt to Override State
Controlled Medical Practice
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CASEY KAUFMAN*

JASON EWING HAS had cancer for four years, and now death is immment. 1 He has gone through all the standard and experimental
treatments, but now even his most optimistic doctor has agreed time is
very short. While this tragedy may be commonplace for the elderly,
Jason is only 35. In high school and college Jason was a track star, an
athlete in top shape. But now, he is starting to notice the effects of the
cancer and shortness of breath is severely limiting his activities. Sadly,
Jason's symptoms will worsen to the point where asphyxiation will
cause his death. The doctors inform him that he has no medical options-radiation and chemotherapy have failed-and surgery is out of
the question.
Jason does not want his wife and children to be burdened with
the last stages of death. He wants their lasting image of him to be one
of strength and poise. In most states, Jason would have to experience
each aspect of dying, progressive and agonizing, until the disease
caused him to stop breathing. However, Jason lives in Oregon and
wants to take advantage of a recently-passed state law that allows him
to avoid this painful end of life by taking control of the situation. Oregon's Death With Dignity Act ("Oregon Act"),2 allows for physicianassisted suicide ("PAS"), giving Jason the option to end his life humanely, without forcing his wife and family to watch him deteriorate.
*
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1. Jason Ewing is a fictional character.
2. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (2001).
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Many other individuals with different diseases, characteristics,
and circumstances find themselves in positions similar to Jason. An
alternative for some, PAS is a heavily debated topic today, and many
states have addressed it with legislation, criminalizing PAS. Oregon
was the first state to allow its citizens an option aside from the natural
course of a terminal disease.3Y In response to the Oregon Act, Attorney
General John Ashcroft issued a directive ("Ashcroft Directive") ordering the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") to prosecute doc4
tors that prescribe life-ending medicine.
Part I of this Note examines the Oregon Act, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Ashcroft Directive. Part II scrutinizes Oregon v.
Ashcroft, the state of Oregon's attempt to enjoin the enforcement of
the Ashcroft directive. That section will identify the parties, their arguments, and the basis of the district court opinion. Although this Note
concurs with the District Court's decision, Part III will suggest an alternate route for the Ninth Circuit to decide its upcoming appeal. Specifically, Part III focuses on principles of federalism and state controlled
medical practice, which require the appeals court to strike the Ashcroft Directive as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
I.

Background

The Oregon Act provides a detailed procedure by which a mentally competent, terminally ill patient can request medication "for the
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified mannei. '5 The Oregon Act allows patients to use medications, such as
secobarbitol or pentobarbital, 6 which are listed as schedule II drugs
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") to end their
life. 7 The CSA was enacted by Congress to address the problem of
drug abuse and illegal trafficking of drugs and organizes drugs from
aspirin to heroin into schedules with different levels of regulation.,
After the Oregon Act took effect, the Attorney General issued a directive ("Ashcroft Directive") which declared that PAS is a practice which
3. See Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facingthe FinalExit: The U.S. Supreme Court Has Left the
Issue of Physician-Assisted Suicide Up to the States. Now the Question is How Law and Society Will
Deal with the Debate., 83 A.B.A.J. 48, 51 (1997).
4. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).

5.

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 127.805(1).

6. See Arthur E. Chin et al., Or. Dep't of Human Res., 1998 Annual Report of Oregon's Death With Dignity Act: The First Year's Experience 5 (1999).
7. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (D. Or. 2002).
8. See id. at 1080.

Summer 2003]

OREGON V. ASHCROFT"

directly violates the CSA. 9 In response to the Ashcroft Directive, the
t
state of Oregon sought to enjoin the order in Oregon v. Ashcrofit °-the
subject of this Note.
A.

The Oregon Act

1. Statutory Provisions of the Oregon Act
The Oregon Act was a citizen's initiative, first passed in 1994 with
a vote of 51% in favor and 49% opposed." Doctors, patients, and residential care facilities immediately sought an injunction to prevent the
Oregon Act from taking effect. 12 A permanent injunction was granted
on Equal Protection grounds, because the Oregon Act lacked sufficient safeguards against preventing suicide of people that were not
terminally ill. 13 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction
and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.' 4 In November
1997, Measure 5115 was placed on the general election ballot to give
Oregon voters a chance to repeal the Oregon Act.' 6 Voters chose to
17
keep the PAS option for Oregon citizens, this time with a 60% vote.
The Oregon Act allows physicians to prescribe lethal medications
to terminally ill Oregon residents.18 A capable'I adult resident of Oregon, who has been diagnosed with a terminal disease and has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for
lethal medication 2 ' from a licensed Oregon physician. 2 1 The patient
must make a simultaneous oral and written request and then, 15 days
9.

10.

See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608.

192 F. Supp. 2d at 1077..

11. See Chin et al., supra note 6, at 1.
12. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).
13. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). Specifically, the court held
that the Oregon Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
as it "provide[d] a means to commit suicide to a severely overinclusive class who may be
competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused by others." Id. at 1437.
14. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir. 1997).
15. This measure was placed on the ballot for a special election. It was sponsored by
the Oregon House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary in H.B. 2954, 69th Leg.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
16. See Chin et al., supra note 6, at 1.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. "'Capable' means that in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient's
attending physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient has the
ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers, including
communication through persons familiar with the patient's manner of communicating if
those persons are available." OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(3) (2001).
20. See id. § 127.805(1).
21. See Chin et al., supra note 6, at 1.
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later, an additional oral request to the physician to write the prescription for life-ending medication. 22 The physician must, along with
23
other requirements, verify that the patient has a terminal disease,
the request was voluntary, and the doctor informed the patient of feasible alternatives, including hospice care and pain control. 24 Lastly,
the physician must verify that the patient's disease is indeed terminal,
25
and a second consulting physician must confirm that opinion.
The patient must self-administer the medication; no physician or
other individual may end the patient's life by lethal injection, mercy
killing, or active euthanasia.2 6 In addition, any person acting in accordance with the Oregon Act is not considered to have committed suicide or to have assisted a suicide. 27 The Oregon Act also exempts a
patient and their family from experiencing typical life insurance policy conditions: if a qualified patient takes advantage of the Oregon
Act, the method of their death shall not have any effect upon insur28
ance or annuity policies.
2.

The Oregon Act's Demographics

From 1998 through 2001, ninety-one people took lethal medications prescribed under the Oregon Act and died. 29 In 2001, thirty30
three physicians gave forty-four patients life-ending medication. Of
these forty-four patients, nineteen died from medication ingestion,
fourteen died from their underlying disease, and eleven remained
alive at the end of 2001.31 Twenty-one patients actually ingested the

lethal medications that year,12 while 6,365 others died in Oregon from
similar underlying causes, without performing PAS.3 3 Demographically, those who took advantage of the Oregon Act were slightly more
likely to be women, have college degrees, and be divorced. 3 4 "Al22. See OR. REv. SrAr. § 127.840.
23. "'Terminal disease' means an incurable and irreversible disease that has been
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within
six months." Id. § 127.800(12) (2001).
24. See id. § 127.815.
25. See id. § 127.805(1).
26. See id. § 127.880.
27.

See id.

28. See id. § 127.875.
29. See Katrina Hedberg, Or. Dep't of Human Res., Fourth Annual Report on Oregon's Death With Dignity Act 3 (2002).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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though the number of prescriptions written for [PAS] has increased
during the past four years, the number of terminally ill patients ingesting lethal medication has remained small, with fewer than 1/10 of
one percent of Oregonians dying by [PAS]."35
B.

The Federal Controlled Substances Act

Congress intended the CSA "to keep legally available controlled
substances within lawful channels of distribution and use."3 6 It establishes five schedules of controlled substances according to their potential for abuse, their current medical use in the United States, and the
psychological and physical effects of abuse. 37 Congress derives its
38
power to control such substances through the Commerce Clause.
Congress made an express finding that controlled substances are creatures of interstate commerce; after manufacturing, they usually travel
through interstate and foreign commerce, and -interstate and intrastate controlled substances cannot be distinguished. 39 In United States
v. Tisor,4° the Ninth Circuit found that Congress has power under the
Constitution to regulate these substances through the Commerce
41
Clause.
The CSA requires physicians and pharmacists to register with the
DEA for authorization to dispense controlled substances. 42 The CSA
specifies procedures by which the Attorney General may delegate any
of his functions under the CSA to other employees or officers of the
Department of Justice ("DOJ").43 The Attorney General delegated, to

the Administrator of the DEA the task of drafting formal regulations
44
to implement the CSA.

It is a DEA regulation that is central to the issues raised in Oregon
v. Ashcroft. 45 Specifically, the Attorney General may suspend or revoke
the registration of a physician or pharmacist if that registration is in35. Id. at 4.
36. JANET RENO, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO ON
OREGON's DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/259ag.
htm.html (last accessed June 1, 2003).
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2002).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
39.

See 21 U.S.C. § 801.

40.

96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1996).

41.

See id. at 375.

42.

See 21 U.S.C. § 822.

43.

See id. § 871(a).

44.

See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1081 (D. Or. 2002).

45.

See id. at 1083.
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consistent with the "public interest. ' 46 In addition, the regulation
states that "[a] prescription for a controlled substance . . . must be

issued for a legitimate medical purpose ... in the usual course of...
professional practice." 4 7 Attorney General Ashcroft interpreted the
"legitimate medical practice" language from the DEA regulation in
conjunction with the "public interest" language from the CSA to muster authority for the Ashcroft Directive. 48 The Directive said PAS was
not a legitimate medical practice and was against public interest, and
therefore physicians or pharmacists that took part in a PAS should
have their licenses revoked.
C.

The Federal Response to the Oregon Act

Prior to the Oregon Act enactment in 1997, Illinois Representative Hyde and Utah Senator Hatch wrote a letter to then-DEA Administrator Constantine, requesting a determination as to whether the
CSA prohibited the use of controlled'substances for the purpose of
assisting suicide. 49 The Congressmen asserted that assisting suicide
through either prescribing or dispensing a controlled substance was
not a legitimate medical purpose in light of DEA regulations, "especially when the practice is not reasonable and necessary to the diagnosis and treatment of disease and injury, legitimate health care, or
compatible with the physician's role as healer."5' 11 Constantine agreed
with that view, indicating that PAS did not constitute a legitimate medical purpose under DEA regulations, and performing PAS violated the
CSA. 5'
Enforcement of Constantine's interpretation would have nullified the Oregon Act by intimidating doctors and pharmacists through
fear of reprisal. Had Constantine declared PAS to be a violation of the
46. Id. § 824(a) (4). The following factors should be considered when determining
the public interest: (1) the recommendation of the appropriate state licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority; (2) the applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to controlled substances; (3) the applicant's conviction record under federal or state laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances; (4) compliance with applicable state, federal, or local laws relating
to controlled substances; or (5) such other conduct which may threaten the public health
and safety. Id. § 823.
47. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2002).
48. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
49. See Sheldon Bradshaw & Robert J. Delahunty, Whether Physician-Assisted Suicide
Serves a "Legitimate Medical Purpose" Under the Drug Enforcement Administration's Regulations
Implementing the Controlled Substances Act, 17 ISSUEs L. & MED. 269, 270 (2002).
50. Id. at 270 n.4 (citation omitted).
51. See id. at 270.
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CSA, the DEA could have revoked doctor or pharmacist registration
required to prescribe or distribute medication, effectively stripping
their ability to work as medical professionals. In addition, the DEA
could have also had them criminally prosecuted and possibly
incarcerated.
On June 5, 1998, former United States Attorney General Janet
Reno reversed Constantine's interpretation of the Oregon Act.5

2

The

United States Attorney General is in command of many executive
branch agencies within the Department of Justice, including the
DEA. 53 Therefore, any DEA action or decision could be overturned by
the Attorney General. Reno found no evidence indicating that Congress intended the CSA to "displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state's determination
as to what constitutes legitimate. medical practice in the absence of a
federal law prohibiting that practice." 54 She further pointed out that
"the CSA is essentially silent with regard to regulating the practice of
medicine that involves legally available drugs." 55 The Federal Government's pursuit of Oregon physicians who comply fully with the Oregon Act would be "beyond the purpose of the CSA."'56 Reno
concluded, "the CSA does not authorize DEA to prosecute, or to revoke the DEA registration of, a physician who has assisted in a suicide
'57
in compliance with Oregon law."

Subsequently, between 1998 and 2000, Congress twice attempted
to pass legislation to outlaw PAS. 58 Congress's first attempt, The Lethal Drug Abuse and Prevention Act of 1998, 59 failed to reach the
floor of either the House or the Senate.6 0 The second attempt, The
Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999,61 passed the House, a2 but failed to

reach the Senate floor .6 " Had it passed, the Pain Relief Promotion Act
would have banned the practice of intentionally dispensing a con52.

See generally JANET RENO, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
WITH DIGNITY ACT, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/

RENO ON OREGON'S DEATH

June/259ag.htm.html (last accessed june 1, 2003).
53. See http://www.usdoj.gov/dojorg.htm (last accessed June 1, 2003).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (D. Or. 2002).
See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 8 (1999).
See Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 n.6.
See H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999).
See 145 CONG. REc. H10903 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999).

63.

See id.
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trolled substance for the purpose of death. 64 In addition, the Pain Relief Promotion Act stated that "the Attorney General shall give no
force and effect to [s]tate law authorizing or permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia."

D.

65

Attorney General Ashcroft's Memorandum: The Ashcroft
Directive

Instead of waiting for -legislation to proceed through congressional pathways, Ashcroft issued the Ashcroft Directive to DEA Administrator Hutchinson on November 6, 2001 .66 Ashcroft determined that
assisting suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" under DEA regulation. 67 Ashcroft based his memorandum on a brief prepared at his
request by the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") ,68 and the Ashcroft
69
Directive explicitly cited to it for legal support of its conclusions.
One argument directly addressed former Attorney General
Reno's reasoning that the DEA lacked the authority to determine legitimate medical practices. 70 Concerning that issue, the OLC first conceded that "Congress did not intend to assign to the DEA the role of
resolving the national debate over [PAS] ."71 Instead, according to the
Ashcroft Directive, Congress intended to give the Attorney General
authority to devise regulations "relating to the.., dispensing of controlled substances and control of regulated persons. '7 2 The regulation
at issue here states that a controlled substance may only be distributed
for a legitimate medical purpose. 73 The OLC opined that "it was well

within the scope of the DEA's authority to determine how that regula64. See H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999).
65. Id.
66. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
67. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (D. Or. 2002).
68. See Bradshaw & Delahunty, supra note 49, at 269-70.
The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel assists
the Attorney General in his function as legal advisor to the President and all of
the executive branch agencies. The Office drafts legal opinions of the Attorney
General and also provides its own written opinions and oral advice in response to
requests from the Counsel to the President, the various agencies of the executive
branch, and offices within the [DOJ].
U.S. DEP'T OF JuSriCE, OmCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ (last accessed June 1, 2003).
69. See Bradshaw & Delahunty, supra note 49.
70. See id. at 289-292.
71. Id. at 290.
72. Id.
73. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2002); see discussion infra Part I.B.
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tion was to be applied to the use of controlled substances in [PAS] .,,74
In sum, this argument made by the OLC proposed the controversial
and disturbing notion that an agency with authority can pass a regulation and then interpret it in a way that might not be aligned with the
congressional intent behind the grant of authority.
Another OLC argument specifically addressed the federalism
principle that "[s] tates are the ... primary regulators of the practice of
medicine. ' 75 Conversely, the OLC argued that CSA legislative history

expanded the authority giveri to the Attorney General and the DEA
into the arena of regulating medicine. 76 Federal regulation in the
medical arena has centered on the dispensing of controlled substances since the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914,7 the predecessor of
the CSA which was enacted in 1970.78 In a 1984 amendment to curb
deaths from prescription drug abuse, 79 Congress expanded the Attorney General and DEA authority under the CSA to refuse or revoke
registration of any "physician who has committed acts 'inconsistent
with the public interest.' "80 Prior to this amendment, registration was
granted unless the physician's state license was revoked or the physician was convicted of a felony.8 1 The amendment listed five factors to
be considered for determining the public interest:
(1) The recommendation of the... [s] tate licensing board or professional disciplinary authority. (2) The applicant's experience...
with respect to controlled substances. (3) The applicant's conviction record .

.

. relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dis-

pensing of controlled substances. (4) Compliance with applicable
[s]tate, [flederal, or local laws relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such
other conduct which may threaten the public health and
82
safety.

The OLC declared that the inclusion of the phrase, "inconsistent
with the public interest," mandated a "standard ...

more demanding

than the standard of a physician's licensing [s] tate."' 3 The brief then
stated that the Attorney General and DEA were now authorized "to
74. Bradshaw & Delahunty, supra note 49, at 290.
75. Id. at 284.
76. See id. at 288-289.
77. See id. at 284 n.27.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 286 n.34 (citing 130 CONG. REc. 25851 (1984) (statement of Rep.
Rodino) ("[P]rescription drugs are responsible for close to 70 percent of the deaths and
injuries due to drug abuse").
80. Id. at 286.
81. See id.
82. 21 U.S.C. § 823 (2002).
83. Bradshaw & Delahunty, supra note 49, at 287.
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enforce the CSA against medical practitioners who prescribe controlled substances in a manner that 'endangers public health or safety'
contrary to the 'public interest' notwithstanding ...state law." 84 The
OLC concluded that the public interest standard authorized suspension or revocation of the DEA registration if a practitioner assisted in a
85
suicide, regardless of a state law that permitted such action.
Using the OLC brief, Ashcroft concluded that PAS was not a legitimate medical practice and stated that the DEA registration of a physician who utilized the Oregon Act would be "inconsistent with public
interest. '8 6 The Ashcroft Directive reversed Reno's position, reinstated the original DEA interpretation, and directed the DEA to enforce a ban on PAS in Oregon.8 7 With one memorandum, the
Attorney General did something that Congress failed to do over two
88
sessions: outlaw PAS.
II.

The Oregon v. Ashcroft Case

On November 7, 2001, Oregon initiated this action by filing a
complaint in the United States District Court of Oregon for declaratory and injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining
order to halt the enforcement of the Ashcroft Directive. 9 Defendants
were John Ashcroft, as United States Attorney General, Administrator
Hutchinson, the Director of the DEA's Portland office, the United
States, the United States Department of justice, and the United States
DEA. 9 1The district court granted the temporary restraining order and
a full hearing on the merits was conducted on March 22, 2002 to determine if a permanent injunction should be issued. 9 1 The substantive
issue in the case was whether the CSA and DEA regulations authorized
the Ashcroft Directive.9 2 As the head of the prosecutorial arm of the
federal executive branch, the "mission of the Office of the Attorney
General is to supervise and direct the administration and operation of
the Department of Justice, including the . . . [DEA]."93 The Ashcroft
84.

Id.

85.
86.

See id.
Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608

(Nov. 9, 2001).
87. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (D. Or. 2002).
88.
89.

See id. at 1079.
See id. at 1084.

90.

See id. at 1077.

91.

See id.at 1084.

92.
93.

See id. at 1087.
See http://www.tisdoj.gov/jmd/manual/ag.htm#ag (last accessed June 1, 2003).
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Directive was not a legally binding instrument, but rather an instruction to both the DOJ and the DEA to disallow PAS through either
revocation of physician and pharmacist professional licenses or crimi94
nal prosecution.
A.

The Plaintiffs' Arguments

The state of Oregon advanced four different arguments against
the validity of the Ashcroft Directive. 95 First, Oregon contended that it
was invalid for failing to issue public notice or solicit commentary as
required by the Administrative Procedures Act. 96 The Administrative
Procedures Act requires public notice and comment before adoption
of substantive, or "legislative-type," regulations; however, there is no
such requirement for "interpretive rules. ' 97 Neither public notice nor
invitations for outside commentary were issued by the Attorney General in conjunction with the Ashcroft Directive. 98 A finding that it was
in fact a substantive regulation would invalidate the directive. 99 Oregon admitted that the substantive/interpretive distinction "is notoriously hazy," but examination of the numerous ongoing debates
regarding PAS and possible ramifications of the Ashcroft Directive indicated a substantive rule issued without the requisite notice and
commentary. 10 0
-Second, Oregon contended that the Attorney General violated
President Clinton's Executive Order 13,132 which promoted federalism among executive agencies." 1 This Executive Order commanded
federal agencies to follow fundamental federalism principles and provided rules for formulating and implementing policies with federalism
implications.' 0 2 The Executive Order thoroughly defined federalism,
and asserted that "it is rooted in the belief that issues that are not
national in scope or significance are most appropriately addressed by
the level of government closest to the people."10 3 Oregon contended
94. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608.
95. See Oregon's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (No. CV 01-1647-JO) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
96. See id. at 20-23.
97. Id. at 20.
98. See Ashcrofi, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Or. 2002).
99. See Memorandum, supra note 95, at 10-14.
100. Id. at 20.
101. See id. at 23.
102. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
103. Id.
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that the Ashcroft Directive defied the order's general intent as well as
the prescribed guidelines. The Ashcroft Directive, therefore, was
invalid. 1114
Third, Oregon argued that the Attorney General violated the Supreme Court's "clear statement"1' 05 rule regarding congressional intent and the agency authority because the Ashcroft Directive did the
following: (1) "invoked" the outer limits of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause, (2) permitted federal encroachment into a
traditional state power, and (3) did so without a "clear statement" of
this intent from Congress.'0 6 If the Attorney General utilized the CSA
in a way that violated the Commerce Clause, the CSA could be found
unconstitutional. Congress did not intend, or delegate the authority
to preempt states regulating the practices of doctors or pharmacists
with either the enactment or 1984 amendment to the CSA. 10 7 Oregon
deduced that without the requisite congressional intent, the Ashcroft
Directive was an unauthorized use of power.' 08
Finally, in the event the court found the Ashcroft Directive authorized by the CSA, Oregon argued the CSA exceeded constitutional
authority. 0 9 First, citing Linder v. United States"" and its supporting
decisions, Oregon declared that the Supreme Court previously held
that "regulation of medical practices is a matter of state" and not federal concern."' Second, Oregon argued the Ashcroft Directive. violated the Commerce Clause because it regulated PAS, a noneconomic, intrastate activity.12 Oregon further argued that even if
the Ashcroft Directive was a rightful exercise of the Attorney General's
authority under the Commerce Clause, it violated the Tenth Amendment protection of state sovereignty by nullifying Oregon's policy
choice regarding a subject reserved to the states.' 13 Any of these constitutional violations would render the CSA invalid and therefore the
Ashcroft Directive would have no force against the Oregon Act.
104. See Memorandum, supra note 95, at 23.
105. "Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result .
Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-173 (2001).
106. Memorandum, supra note 95, at 24.
107. See id. at 25-31.
108. See id. at 31.
109. See id. at 31-37.
110. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
111. Supra note 95, at 32.
112. See id. at 33-35.
113. See id. at 35-36.
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Patient plaintiffs raised arguments similar to those introduced by
Oregon, and asserted one additional Constitutional claim. 114 They
contended that the Ashcroft Directive contravened their Fifth Amendment right to palliative care, up to and including, terminal sedation.115 They were afraid that physicians would be discouraged "from
prescribing pain management drugs out of fear that such action could
be viewed after the fact, by DEA agents ...as an 'intentional' effort to
end a patient's life."' 16 This "chilling effect," patient plaintiffs contended, would make physicians reluctant to prescribe sufficient medication when people needed aggressive pain management most-"at
' 17
the end of life when death is near and pain is intractable."
B.

The Defendants' Arguments

The defendants first asserted that the CSA did not authorize the
dispensing of controlled substances for assisted suicide.'" 8 Rather, the
defendants argued that the memorandum addressed the intent of the
CSA to regulate controlled substances and the validity of the DEA regulation requiring controlled substances to be used only for legitimate
medical purposes. 119 Defendants drew support for their contentions
from the OLC brief, addressed earlier in this Note, and concluded
that the Attorney General was fully authorized by the CSA to determine PAS was not a legitimate medical practice. 120
Defendants then addressed the issues concerning the Administrative Procedures Act's notice and comment requirements for substantive rules. 12 1 The defendants asserted that the Ashcroft Directive is an
interpretive rule, one issued to "advise the public of the agency's construction of rules it administers."1 22 They supported this finding with
four relevant "conclusions" reached by Ashcroft:
114.

See Patient Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judg-

ment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for SummaryJudgment, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (No. CV 01-1647JO) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brie].
115. See id. at 27.

116. Id. at 28.
117. Id. at 28-29.
118. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment at 12-36, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (No. CV 01-1647JO).
119. See id. at 13-21.
120. See id. at 32-35.
121. See id. at 44-52.
122. Id. at 44 (quoting Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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[1] . .. assisting suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose"
within the meaning of [the DEA regulation] .... [2] prescribing,
dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the CSA[,] [3] [s]uch conduct by a physician
registered to dispense controlled substances may "render his registration ... inconsistent with the public interest" and therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation ... [, and] [4] [t]his
conclusion applies regardless of whether state law authorizes or
permits such conduct ....123
Defendants then proceeded to refute plaintiffs' constitutional
claims by legitimizing the constitutionality of the CSA. 12 4 They
claimed the CSA was a valid exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause, basing its support on congressional claims and findings
in section 801 of the CSA that expounded the interstate nature of
controlled substances.1 2 5 Defendants also claimed the CSA did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it did not force states or state
t 26
officers to administer federal regulation.
In response to the patient plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim, the
Attorney General contended that the Ashcroft Directive affirmatively
promoted pain management. 2 7 In addition, defendants cited numerous decisions which held there was no Fifth Amendment right to any
specific type of drug or treatment.1 28 Lastly, the Attorney General refuted President Clinton's Executive Order argument by citing a portion of the order that the plaintiffs' motion did not address.' 2 9
Specifically, the defendants' brief cited section 11 of the order, entitled 'Judicial Review," which stated that "[t] his order is intended only
to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is
not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its
officers, or any person."13 1 The Attorney General relied on cases addressing the binding affect of Executive Orders to conclude that Executive Order 13132 only created obligations within the executive
branch and did not supply a right that private parties or states may
enforce. ' 3
123. Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
124. See id. at 36-44.
125. See id. at 36-40.
126. See id. at 41-42.
127. See id. at 42.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 52-54.
130. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,259 (Aug. 10, 1999) [hereinafter
Executive Order].
131. See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 114, at 52-54.
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The District Court Opinion

The district court analyzed the issue at bar via statutory interpretation.1 3 2 It scrutinized the plain language of the CSA and found no
explicit or implicit support that the CSA delegated authority to the
Attorney General or the DEA to decide the question of whether PAS
13constitutes a legitimate medical purpose or practice. 1
The court then turned to the legislative history of the CSA and
found no suggestion that Congress intended the CSA to restrict prescriptions for controlled substances that might be used legitimately
under state law to assist suicide.1 34 The court found that the core objective of the CSA was to permit federal prosecution of drug dealers,
drug abusers, and practitioners who engage in the illegal diversion
13 5
and distribution of drugs.
With regard to federalism issues, the court opined that determination of what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose has traditionally been left to the individual states.13 6 States determine medical
standards that specifically and clearly define what is lawful.' 37 Here,
the court found that "the Oregon voters have made the legal, albeit
controversial, decision that such a practice is legitimate in this sovereign state." 3 8
The district court concluded the opinion with a general appraisal
of the events that led to the suit. 1 39 It noted the failure of Congress to
pass two acts that would have limited PAS.1 40 The court recognized
the efforts of certain congressional leaders to "get through the administrative door that which they could not get through the congressional
door, seeking refuge with the newly-appointed Attorney General
whose ideology matched their views."' 4 1 As a final thought, the opinion stated that legislative action attempting to control matters traditionally left to the state may raise Constitutional concerns.1 4 2 A
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1093 (D. Or. 2002).
See id. at 1089.
See id. at 1089-90.
See id. at 1090.
See id. at 1092.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1092-1093.
See id. at 1093.
Id.
See id.
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permanent injunction was entered, on April 17, 2002, enjoining the
143
Ashcroft Directive from application.
III.

Analyses and Criticisms

Attorney General Ashcroft appealed the issue of whether he had
"permissibly construed the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations to prohibit the prescription of controlled substances for suicide."' 4 4 Oregon v. Ashcroft is currently pending before
the Ninth Circuit. This Note will examine two avenues, aside from
statutory interpretation, by which the Ninth Circuit should decide Oregon v. Ashcroft in order that the Oregon Act remains in effect for the
citizens of Oregon. First, the traditional state right to determine legitimate medical practices will be examined via the United States Supreme Court case, Linder v. United States. It held that state law, not
federal law, controls questions of medical practice. 4 5 Although decided in 1925, the Linder case is legally and factually similar to how a
DEA prosecution of a doctor in light of the Ashcroft Directive would
occur. Its opinion, rooted in principles of federalism, should control
the Ninth Circuit's Oregon v. Ashcroft decision. 146 Second, this Note will
examine Tenth Amendment jurisprudence to expand the argument
that the Ashcroft Directive is commandeering state sovereign
power. 147
A.

Federalism and Linder v. United States

Federalism is "[t]he relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a federal system
of government."'148 Clinton's Executive Order explained that:

The nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public policies adopted by the people of the several
[s]tates according to their own conditions, needs, and desires. In
the search for enlightened public policy, individual [s]tates and
communities are free to experiment with a variety of approaches to
public issues. One-size-fits-all approaches to public policy can inhibit the creation of effective solutions to those problems.' 49
143. See id.
144. Brief for Appellants at 2, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002)
(No. 02-35587).
145. See id. at 18.
146. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
147. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
148. BL c's LAw DICTIONARY 627 (7th ed. 1999).
149. Executive Order, supra note 130 at 13,259.
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The Framers of the Constitution instituted the sovereign state system through the form and structure of the Constitution.
1. The Linder Case
Linder recognized that "direct control of medical practice in the
States is beyond the power of the Federal government."' 15 0 The Supreme Court in Linder examined the conviction of Dr. Linder under
the Harrison Narcotic Law (Narcotic Law) for dispensing morphine
and cocaine to a known drug addict.'5 1 Dr. Linder was accused of
violating section 2 of the Narcotic Law that stated that any use, sale, or
distribution of drugs taxed by the Narcotic Law must be in the lawful
and legitimate practice of his profession. 152 Dr. Linder was indicted
based upon the finding that distributing one tablet of morphine and
three tablets of cocaine to an addict was a violation of the Narcotic
53

Law. 1

The Narcotic Law required the registration of persons that produce, dispense, sell, or distribute opium or coca leaves and their derivatives with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") for the purpose of
imposing a special tax. 15 4 Under the law, a doctor had to be registered
with the IRS, which Dr. Linder was. 15 5 The declared intent of the Narcotic Law was to provide revenue; it says nothing of "addicts" and did
156
not undertake to regulate any type of medical treatment.
The Supreme Court overturned Dr. Linder's conviction because
he did nothing that violated the Narcotic Law, and the holding raised
15 7
issues pertinent to Oregon v. Ashcroft.
Obviously, direct control of medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government. Incidental regulation
of such practice by Congress through a taxing act cannot extend to
matters plainly inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of a revenue measure .... The enactment ...

may

regulate medical practice in the States only so far as reasonably
appropriate for or merely incidental to its enforcement. 158
150.
151.

Linder, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
See id.at 10-16.

152.
153.
154.
155.

See id.at
See id.at
See id.at
See id.at

156.

Id.at 17-18.

13.
10.
12.
10.

157.

See id.at 22.

158.

Id.at 18.
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The Court also said, "Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing
delegated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not en59
trusted to the Federal Government."'
The Linder Court dealt with two different issues, taxation and
state-controlled medical practice. How congressional taxation and
spending power has changed since Linder is not of concern in this
Note. Instead, this Note relies upon Linder's holding that the state
controls medical practice, which has been reinforced repeatedly since
the decision was issued. 1 i°
2.

Legal and Factual Analogies to Oregon v. Ashcroft

The factual similarities between Linder and Oregon v. Ashcroft are
uncanny, especially considering that more than seventy-five years has
elapsed between the two cases. In both Linder and Oregon v. Ashcroft
the DOJ prosecutors attempted to attack a specific state-allowed medical practice by way of federal law. However, Congress did not implement either of these underlying Congressional acts with the intent to
regulate these medical practices. There are three strong similarities
between the two cases. Both situations concern physicians performing
medical practices that were legal under their state laws. Both concern
physicians in compliance with the underlying federal legislation.
Lastly, the intents of the underlying Congressional acts would be similarly misconstrued to support the federal interest of prosecution.
First, in Linder, Dr. Linder's act of giving morphine and cocaine
to a known addict was not actually a violation of Washington state
law.' 6 Similarly, in the state of Oregon, the Death With Dignity Act
was established to allow PAS. 162 Therefore, in both cases, physicians
159. Id. at 17.
160. See Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935) ("That the
state may regulate the practice of dentistry, prescribing the qualifications that are reasonably necessary, and to that end may require licenses and establish supervision by an administrative board, is not open to dispute."); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954)
("It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct
within its borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital part of a state's police
power. The state's discretion in that field extends naturally to the regulation of all professionals concerned with health."); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827 (1975) ("The State,
of course, has a legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of medical care provided
within its borders."); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) ("It is, of course, well
settled that the State has broad police powers in regulating the administration of drugs by
the health professions."); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Our decision is consistent with principles of federalism that have left states as primary regulators of
professional conduct.").
161. See Linder, 268 U.S. at 10-12.
162. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1081-1082 (D. Or. 2002).
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performed medical practices legal under state law. Linder held that
states are to decide what a medical practice is and that this determina163
tion is beyond the legislative territory of the federal government.
Applying Linder's federalism holding to the situation in Oregon v. Ashcroft, the Oregon Act would trump the Ashcroft Directive and support
state determination of whether PAS is a legitimate medical practice.
Second, Dr. Linder was properly registered with the IRS and in
compliance with the Narcotic Act at the time of his alleged violation.'1 4 Likewise, doctors in Oregon could properly register with the
DEA and comply with the CSA but still be in violation of the Ashcroft
Directive. Therefore, in both situations, a physician could comply fully
with the underlying federal legislation and still be targeted for prosecution. The fact that a doctor in full compliance with the CSA can still
violate the Ashcroft Directive crystallizes the misguided application of
the CSA by the Attorney General.
Lastly, the explicit congressional intent behind the Narcotic Law
was to raise revenue through taxation.165 The explicit congressional
intent of the CSA was to curb drug abuse and illegal drug trafficking.'6 6 In both cases, the DOJ twisted congressional intent of the underlying legislation to further an agenda of federal control over what
constitutes a medical practice within a state. "Federal power is delegated [from the Constitution], and its prescribed limits must not be
' 67
transcended even though the end seemlis] desirable."'
3.

Current Views of Federalism

Current attitudes towards federalism reveal support for Oregon's
sovereign right to pass a law condoning PAS.
a.

The Supreme Court and Federalism

The Supreme Court continues to support the Linder ideal that
states determine what constitutes legitimate medical practices. PAS
was addressed at length in Washington v. Glucksberg,'"8 which concerned the constitutionality of Washington's ban on assisted suicide. 16"9 Refusing unwanted lifesaving medical treatment is considered
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 17.
See Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
Linder, 268 U.S. at 22.
521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
See id. at 705-706.
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a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment, 17° and Glucksberg addressed whether the right included "a right to commit suicide
71
which itself include[d] a right to assistance in doing so."'
The Court refused to recognize a constitutional right to assisted
suicide. 172 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion remarked upon the complexity of the issue: "[t] hroughout the Nation, Americans are engaged
in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
173
practicality of [PAS] ... as it should (be] in a democratic society."
Furthermore, the Court refused to weigh the various state interests in
a ban, holding that "Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least
reasonably related to their promotion and protection."' 74 In her concurrence,Justice O'Connor asserted that when deciding such sensitive
issues such as the debate surrounding PAS, "the ... challenging task
of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding ... liberty inter-

ests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States."' 75 "The Court declined to 'strike down the considered policy choice' of the State of
Washington, deferring instead to that state's resolution of the debate."' 176 Implied in the Court's holding is that the state may resolve
the PAS issue according to their own state interests, even if the state
legalizes PAS, despite the fact there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide.
b.

The Ninth Circuit and Federalism

Conant v. Walters, 177 decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2002, revealed that court's attitude towards states' rights. Although it was decided on an issue not applicable to Oregon v. Ashcroft, the opinion is
important, nonetheless. Conant v. Walters resolved a First Amendment
issue regarding the ability of doctors to recommend the use of marijuana to their patients. 78 California passed the Compassionate Use
Act of 1996 ("California Act") 179 which stated that "no physician in
this state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for hay170. See id. at 720.
171. Id. at 723.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 735.Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the majority.
174. Id. at 728-733.
175. Id. at 737. (O'Connor, J., concurring).Justices Ginsburg and Breyerjoined in this
portion of the concurrence.
176. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079 (D. Or. 2002) (citing Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 737).
177. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
178. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 632.
179.

CAL. HEALTJH & SAFETY CODE § 1]362.5 (West 2003).
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ing recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes." 8 0 In
response to the California Act, the federal government issued a policy
("Federal Marijuana Policy") that stated that a "practitioner's action of
recommending or prescribing Schedule I controlled substances is not
consistent with the 'public interest' . . . and will lead to administrative
action . . . to revoke the practitioner's registration."]81 The Federal
Marijuana Policy was an executive branch response aimed at nullifying
properly enacted state legislation and is analogous to the Ashcroft
Directive.
Patients, physicians, and organizations brought action against the
Federal Marijuana Policy in early 1997.182 A permanent injunction was
issued, enjoining the government from revoking the DEA registration
of certain physicians who recommended the use of marijuana. 1 3 It
of those physialso enjoined the DEA from initiating any investigation
1 84
recommendation.
that
of
basis
the
on
cians
Conant addressed physician recommendations for marijuana use,
whereas a separate but related case, United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop, 185 dealt with the actual distribution of marijuana for medical purposes.' 8 6 Oakland Cannabis addressed whether federal law
18 7
prohibiting marijuana distribution preempted the California Act.
The main difference between Conant and Oakland Cannabisis whether
the CSA applies to their respective practices. In Oakland Cannabis, the
issue was whether a cooperative could manufacture and distribute marijuana to patients. 8 Manufacture and distribution of marijuana is
validly regulated by the CSA.189 In Conant, the issue was whether physicians could recommend the use of marijuana to their patients. 190 The
180.
181.
215, 62
182.
183.
184.

Id. § 11362.5(c).
Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition
Fed. Reg 6164-01 (Feb. 11, 1997).
See Conant, 309 F.3d at 633.
See id. at 634.
See id. at 634.

185. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
186. See id. The Supreme Court has held that there is no medical necessity exception in
the CSA for manufacturing or distributing marijuana. United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. at 494. Marijuana is a Schedule I drug, for which Congress has
found no legitimate medical use; this will not influence Oregon v. Ashcrofl because the drugs
used for PAS are found in Schedule II, for which there are legitimate medical purposes. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG SCHEDULING, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/scheduling.
html (last accessed June 1, 2003).
187. See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 486-489.
188. See id. at 487.

189.

See id. at 486.

190.

See Conant, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Ninth Circuit did not address the applicability of the CSA to recommendations of marijuana use, and instead held that the federal policy
barring physician recommendations of medical marijuana use to patients violated the First Amendment.1 9 '
The Conant court's understanding of federalism should control
the appellate decision in Oregon v. Ashcroft because of the applicability
of Conant'sfindings to the situation posed in Oregon v. Ashcroft. In the
Conant majority opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated its
view of medical practice regulation:
Our decision today is consistent with principles of federalism that
have left states as primary regulators of professional conduct. See
Whalen v. Roe [citation omitted] (recognizing states' broad police
powers to regulate the administration of drugs by health professionals); Linder v. United States [citation omitted] ('direct control of
medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal
government'). We must 'show[ ] respect for the sovereign States
that comprise our Federal Union. That respect imposes a duty on
federal courts, whenever possible, to avoid or minimize conflict between federal and state law, particularly in situations in which the
citizens of a State have chosen to serve as a laboratory in the trial of
novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of
92
the country.'
This opinion provides unwavering support of state regulated

medical practice. The statement declaring the Ninth Circuit's prostates' rights views appeared at the end of the Conant opinion, after a
thorough analysis and holding with respect to the First Amend-

ment.19 3 This Note contends that' the above statement was not idle
rambling; rather, it was to provide pro-states' rights advice for the
court to rely upon when deciding Oregon v. Ashcroft.
The court's reference to federalism case law is also more relevant
to the issues in Oregon v. Ashcroft than Conant. It cites to Whalen v. Roe
and Linder v. United States for their support regarding state control of
medical practice. 91 4 Prior to handing down the Conant decision, the
Supreme Court found any distribution of marijuana illegal, so the Conant court was not citing these cases to support state-sanctioned marijuana distribution. This Note further contends that the Conant court
was citing Whalen and Linder to restate the Ninth Circuit's support for
their state controlled medical practice holdings. The court's "laboratory" view of the states is precisely why Oregon could pass the Oregon
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id. at 634-639.
Id. at 639 (citation omitted).
See id,
See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483.
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Act, and the Ninth Circuit should decide Oregon v. Ashcroft based on
that principle.
B.

The Ashcroft Directive Commandeers the Oregon Legislature

Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is also instructive, addressing
the federal government's inability to commandeer states or state officials into enforcing federal legislation. 195 In New York v. United
States, 1 9 6 the Supreme Court overturned federal legislation that attempted to obligate states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste produced within their borders. 9 7 The Court recognized that the
Constitution "divides power among sovereigns and among branches
of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of
the day."' 19 8 In striking down the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, the Supreme Court noted that "the
[flederal [g]overnment may not compel the [s]tates to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."' 9 9
Later, in Printz v. United States,20 ° the Supreme Court addressed
the Federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The Act was an
attempt to regulate the distribution of guns throughout the country
by establishing a national instant background check system. 20 1 It contained an interim provision, mandating prospective gun purchasers to
file a form with their local chief law enforcement officer. 2112 The officer would then have to make a reasonable effort to perform a background check to determine if the sale to that buyer would violate the
law. 2113 The Court found the act unconstitutional because it required
state police officers to conduct federally mandated background
20 4
checks on prospective handgun purchasers.
This Note contends that the Ashcroft Directive violates this Tenth
Amendment doctrine by excessively interfering with Oregon's sovereignty. The Oregon Act was properly enacted by voters and concerns
195. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
196. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
197. See id. at 144.
198. Id. at 187.
199. Id. at 188.
200. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
201. See id. at 902.
202. See id. at 902-903.
203. See id. at 903.
204. See id.

1088

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

an area of traditional state power. The Ashcroft Directive can be likened to the federal acts struck down in Printz and New York, with the
similarities lying in the federal effort to control a sovereign state action. In effect, the Ashcroft Directive compels Oregon and its legislature to outlaw PAS by undermining that State's ability to pass the
Oregon act.
Coincidentally, Judge Kozinski authored a concurring opinion in
Conant that addressed this vein of Supreme Court Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence. 2 5 He stated that "[i]n the circumstances of this case,
however, I believe the federal government's policy runs afoul of the
'commandeering' doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in New
York v. United States... and Printz v. United States ....
judge Kozinski quoted part of the following, from Printz:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States'
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens
or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally °7
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.

Judge Kozinski applied Printz by stating that the Federal Marijuana Policy would violate the commandeering doctrine by forcing a
state to "criminalize behavior it has chosen to make legal.120 8 Furthermore, "allowing the federal government, already nearing the outer
limits [209] of its power, to act through unwilling state officials would
'obliterate the distinction' [between federal and state government]
2 10
entirely."
ApplyingJudge Kozinski's views to Oregon v. Ashcroft, a state sovereignty argument crystallizes. The Ashcroft Directive attempts to commandeer Oregon by abolishing the state law decriminalizing PAS, just
as the Federal Marijuana Policy attempted to commandeer California
into abolishing a state law decriminalizing recommendations to use
medical marijuana. In a sense, Ashcroft commandeers the Oregon
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
authors

See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
Id. at 645 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
Conant, 309 F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
The Ashcroft Directive lies at the "outer limits" of federal power insofar as many
feel that the Ashcroft Directive would not pass muster under the Commerce

Clause. See Lindsay R. Kandra, Comment: Questioning the Foundation of Attorney General Ashcroft's Attempt to Invalidate Oregon's Death With Dignity Act, 81 OR. L. REV. 505, 539-542

(2002). In addition, that author opined that the Ashcroft Directive violated the Supremacy
Clause; see Kandra, supra at 536-539.
210. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
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legislative process by rendering a citizen's ability to pass a law concerning a traditional area of state sovereignty impotent.
Ashcroft's actions are exactly what Judge Kozinski feared: the
Ashcroft Directive criminalizes behavior that the state of Oregon
chooses to make legal. Through his directive, Attorney General Ashcroft effectively commands Oregon lawmakers to repeal a law with
which he disagrees. This situation is what the New York and Printz
courts avoided by striking down their respective federal acts. In deciding the appeal, the Ninth Circuit should address Ashcroft's attempt to
commandeer the Oregon democratic process in violation of the
Tenth Amendment.
Conclusion
This Note examines Oregon's law allowing PAS and Attorney
General John Ashcroft's attempt to criminalize it. This Note urges the
Ninth Circuit to preserve the determination of medical practices to
the states, which is the proper arena for a decision regarding the legality of the medical practice of PAS. The court should follow Linder and
Conant as applicable legal precedent, and find the Ashcroft Directive
an unconstitutional application of the CSA.
Returning to Mr. Ewing's dilemma, Oregon followed the recommended avenue of debate and democratic legislation to legalize PAS.
The court should not allow the Attorney General to commandeer the
Oregon legislature and take away his ability to perform PAS.
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